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bcrypt - Time-Tested Password Hashing

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bcrypt is a password hashing function based on the Blowfish cipher, designed in 1999 by Niels Provos and David Mazières. Its defining feature is a design in which adjusting the cost factor (work factor) increases the computational cost exponentially, allowing the security strength to be raised in step with improvements in hardware performance. The OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet (as of October 2026) says bcrypt should only be used for legacy systems where Argon2 and scrypt are not available.

Historical Background

Before bcrypt appeared, Unix systems used the DES-based crypt function for password hashing. However, by the late 1990s the speedup of CPUs made the computational cost of crypt insufficient, and dictionary attacks and brute-force attacks had become realistic threats. As part of the OpenBSD project, Provos and Mazières designed bcrypt as an adaptive hash function intended to "remain secure even on future hardware."

How the Cost Factor Works

bcrypt's cost factor is specified as an integer from 4 to 31, and internally it performs 2-to-the-cost-power iterations. Increasing the cost factor by 1 roughly doubles the computation time.

Cost factorIterationsApproximate processing timeUse case
101,024About 100 msOWASP minimum
124,096About 400 msAbove the minimum
1416,384About 1.5 secondsBeyond the one-second guideline

The OWASP cheat sheet says the work factor should be as large as the performance of the verification server allows, and gives as a general rule that calculating a hash should take less than one second. The cost factor can be raised later as hardware becomes more powerful.

Automatic Salt Generation and Storage Format

bcrypt automatically generates a 128-bit salt and stores it together with the hash value as a single string. As a result, developers do not need to separately implement salt generation or management.

$2b$12$LJ3m4ys3Lg7Ey6yGqV8sZeKxYBCfGJZiNL5.mDHbgA7cWyPCkxbC6
├ $2b$ ... algorithm version
├ 12$ ... cost factor
├ LJ3m4ys3Lg7Ey6yGqV8sZe ... salt (22 characters)
└ KxYBCfGJZiNL5.mDHbgA7cWyPCkxbC6 ... hash value (31 characters)

Comparison with Argon2

One difference between bcrypt and Argon2 is whether they are memory-hard. bcrypt is a CPU-bound function and does not demand large amounts of memory for its computation. As a result, it offers less resistance than Argon2 against attacks that run hash computations in parallel on GPUs with thousands of cores. For new systems, Argon2id is the first choice. When migrating a system that already uses bcrypt, one approach is to re-hash on the next login. The overall design of password storage is explained in the secure password management guide.

Caveats of the 72-Byte Limit

Most bcrypt implementations have a limitation in that the input password is truncated at 72 bytes. In UTF-8 encoding, a single Japanese character consumes 3 bytes, so for a password consisting only of Japanese characters the effective upper limit is 24 characters. With a mix of alphanumeric characters, up to 72 characters are valid, but anything beyond that is ignored. To work around this limit, there is a technique of pre-hashing the password with SHA-256 before passing it to bcrypt, but it can be dangerous because of pitfalls such as the null-byte problem. OWASP calls for a password policy that enforces a maximum password length of 72 bytes or less.

Common Misconceptions

The perception that "bcrypt is old, so it is dangerous" is not accurate. What becomes a problem is when the cost factor is too low (below 10) or when an old implementation containing library bugs continues to be used. The historical evolution of password hashing is also introduced in the article on the history and culture of passwords. For the basics of cryptography, see the basics of encryption.

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