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Lateral Movement - Spreading Inside a Network

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Lateral movement is an attack technique in which, after securing an initial foothold inside a network, an attacker moves sideways through the network to reach more valuable systems and data. From the first machine compromised, the attacker advances step by step toward seizing administrator privileges or reaching the domain controller. In ransomware attacks, lateral movement spreads encryption to other systems in the organization, so detection and containment at this stage help limit the extent of the damage.

Position in the Kill Chain

In the cyber kill chain framework, lateral movement is listed as one of the actions an attacker may take in the final phase, actions on objectives. After passing through reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, and command and control (C2), the attacker uses the first compromised machine as a hop point to move to other systems. The figure below is an example that divides the path from intrusion to objectives into steps, and its steps are divided differently from the seven phases of the kill chain.

Initial access
Establish foothold
Lateral movement
Actions on objectives (data theft / encryption)

Representative Techniques

Attackers use a variety of techniques for lateral movement. Techniques that abuse legitimate authentication mechanisms and administrative tools are difficult to distinguish from normal traffic.

Pass-the-Hash (PtH)

A technique that uses a password's hash value directly for authentication. By abusing the NTLM authentication specification, an attacker can log in to other machines without knowing the plaintext password.

Pass-the-Ticket (PtT)

A technique that steals and reuses Kerberos authentication tickets (TGT/TGS). A stolen TGT can be used to request service tickets for any resource the user has privileges to access.

Abuse of RDP / SSH

Using stolen credentials to connect via Remote Desktop or SSH and directly operate another machine. Because legitimate administrative tools are used, detection is difficult.

Abuse of Active Directory

Active Directory (AD) in Windows environments is one of the targets of lateral movement. Because AD centrally manages every user, computer, and group policy within the domain, taking over the domain controller hands control of the entire domain to the attacker. Attackers extract in-memory credentials with tools such as Mimikatz and, in a Golden Ticket attack, use the password hash of the KRBTGT account to forge TGTs that can authenticate as any account in Active Directory. From the perspective of IAM, protecting privileged accounts is part of the countermeasures.

Defense Through Microsegmentation

Microsegmentation, which subdivides network segmentation even further, is one of the defenses against lateral movement. By isolating segments at the workload level and strictly controlling communication between segments, it can restrict movement to adjacent machines even if an attacker compromises one machine. It is also used in zero trust architecture.

Detection with EDR / NDR

EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) monitors suspicious process execution and file access on endpoints to detect signs of lateral movement. NDR (Network Detection and Response) analyzes network traffic to detect unusual internal communication patterns (for example, a direct connection from an ordinary user's device to the domain controller). By combining the two, lateral movement can be captured from both the endpoint and the network sides.

The Mindset of Stopping the Damage at the First Machine

The starting point of defense against lateral movement is accepting the premise that the initial intrusion cannot be prevented completely. As long as techniques such as phishing exploit the actions of users, no amount of training or perimeter defense can reduce the compromise of the first machine to zero. The focus of defense therefore shifts to keeping the attacker from advancing beyond the compromised machine and to noticing attempts to move as early as possible. These two work on different axes: segment isolation narrows, on the spatial axis, the very range within which movement is possible, while monitoring with EDR or NDR shortens, on the temporal axis, the time during which the attacker acts freely. When both are functioning, even if an intrusion occurs, there is a chance of stopping the movement before the attacker reaches the target systems.

Ransomware countermeasures are explained in detail in our article on ransomware defense, responses to insider threats in our article on insider threat countermeasures, and the implementation of zero trust in our article on zero trust security.

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