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Supply Chain Attacks - Threats in Software Delivery

About 2 min read

A supply chain compromise is an attack technique in which an attacker intervenes at some stage of software development, build, or distribution to inject malicious code into legitimate software. Because it abuses the trusted update path of software, it reaches users as a legitimate update.

What Verification Can and Cannot Confirm

A mechanism that records and compares a fingerprint of what was distributed answers whether what was obtained is the same as what was published. What it cannot answer is whether what was published is itself legitimate. Where a release that went through the procedures on the developer side and was published through the proper channel contains malicious code, the comparison matches. That is why this kind of attack sits poorly with conventional detection: the traces of the intrusion remain not in the environment of the user but in the upstream working environment, which the user cannot see. Next, the decision to fix a version in place has two sides as well. Fixing it means no unintended substitution occurs, but it also stops corrections from being taken in. If a defect is published while the version stays fixed, the release in which that defect remains goes on being used. Neither fixing nor updating is the safe option; the choice becomes a question of where to place the effort of checking. The third point is the extent of what is covered. When parts are chosen for inclusion, what was chosen is only the set whose names were written down directly, whereas what is actually brought in is the whole that includes the parts those require. As the number grows, so does the proportion of parts whose names have never been seen. Grasping the extent is therefore not a matter of drawing up a list of what was chosen, but of counting the whole, including everything that follows on from it. For the part that is not grasped, there is also no way to know whether an update has occurred.

Supply Chain Attack Flow

Attacker breaches the build environment, repository, or maintainer
Malicious code is injected into legitimate software
The tainted version is distributed through the legitimate update channel
Users install or update it in good faith
The attacker accesses the internal network through the backdoor

Historical Background

Supply chain compromise drew global attention with the 2020 SolarWinds incident. A backdoor was planted in the build process of the IT management tool Orion, and in a December 2020 filing SolarWinds put the number of customers that may have had an installation of the affected updates at fewer than 18,000. Incidents targeting supply chains continued afterwards, such as the 2021 Kaseya VSA attack and the 2024 xz Utils backdoor. The xz Utils case carries the CVE number CVE-2024-3094, and according to the developer notice, the release archives of versions 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 contained a backdoor.

Defensive Measures

Creating and managing an SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) is one of the defensive measures. Know which open-source libraries you use and their versions, and continuously monitor vulnerability information. Committing dependency lockfiles (package-lock.json, Gemfile.lock) keeps installed versions aligned with what they record. In the build pipeline, signature verification and hash checks detect tampering of artifacts. Additions and changes to dependencies are also among the things checked during code review. One measure against unauthorized access to the build process is protecting CI/CD systems and package registry accounts with strong random passwords.

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